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TREATMENT DIFFERENCES AND POLITICAL REALITIES
IN THE GAAP-IFRS DEBATE
William W. Bratton* and Lawrence A. Cunningham**
INTRODUCTION

I

NTERNATIONAL Financial Reporting Standards (“IFRS”)
have swept the globe1 even as Generally Accepted Accounting
Principles (“GAAP”) have retained their hold over reporting
companies and securities markets in the United States. But the
globalization wave continues to rise and GAAP’s days appear to
be numbered, along with those of its generator, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (“FASB”). The Securities and Exchange
Commission (“SEC”), long the backer and protector of GAAP and
the FASB, lately changed course to defect against them in favor of
IFRS and its generator, the International Accounting Standards
Board (“IASB”). The road to defection began when the SEC
eliminated the requirement that foreign issuers registered in the
United States and reporting under IFRS restate their financials to
GAAP.2 The political economic logic of globalization took over
from there. In 2007, the SEC proposed to extend the option to report under IFRS to U.S. issuers.3 That option, said the SEC, would
afford competitive advantages to U.S. issuers with extensive opera*
Peter P. Weidenbruch, Jr., Professor of Business Law, Georgetown University
Law Center.
**
Henry St. George Tucker III, Research Professor of Law, The George Washington University Law School. For excellent research assistance, thanks to Chris Davis
and Dan Martin.
1
For an account of this, see Lawrence A. Cunningham, The SEC’s Global Accounting Vision: A Realistic Appraisal of a Quixotic Quest, 87 N.C. L. Rev. 1 (2008).
2
Acceptance from Foreign Private Issuers of Financial Statements Prepared in Accordance with International Financial Reporting Standards Without Reconciliation to
U.S. GAAP, Exchange Act Release No. 33-8879, 73 Fed. Reg. 986 (2008), reprinted in
[2002 to Current Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 88,032 (Dec. 21, 2007).
3
Concept Release on Allowing U.S. Issuers to Prepare Financial Statements in Accordance with International Financial Reporting Standard, Exchange Act Release
Nos. 33-8831, 72 Fed. Reg. 45,600 (proposed Aug. 14, 2007), reprinted in [2002 to Current Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 87,944 (Aug. 7, 2007) [hereinafter
2007 Concept Release].
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tions abroad.4 But the commentators pushed back.5 They argued
that the value of global convergence in accounting standards lies in
enhanced comparability across the financials of different issuers;6
accordingly, admitting two competing accounting systems into the
domestic market would only retard progress toward the goal. The
SEC responded by admitting the policy salience of comparability
and doubling its bet on IFRS: it has produced a new “Roadmap”
that describes a process leading to mandatory use of IFRS by domestic issuers by 2014.7 The Roadmap bypasses an alternative,
more painstaking route to convergence—a longstanding joint project of the FASB and the IASB directed to the articulation of a
common set of accounting standards.8
Professor Cox accepts the termination of the requirement of
GAAP restatements by foreign issuers.9 We agree, for the reasons
he states. We read him to be concerned about an IFRS option for
U.S. issuers,10 and so are we. We read him to be very concerned
about the elimination of GAAP,11 and so are we. We would like to
4

Id. ¶ 45,601.
One of us has raised the following objections: (1) effective competition presupposes full information and IASB has a practice of misrepresenting the contents of
IFRS; and (2) widespread adoption of IFRS signals a national-level preference for
comparability over competition. See Cunningham, supra note 1, at 26–27. Numerous
accounting scholars expressed opposition to the SEC’s ambitions, although for a wide
variety of reasons. For a collection and summary, see Posting of David Albrecht to
The Summa–Debits and Credits of Accounting Professor David Albrecht,
http://profalbrecht.wordpress.com/2008/10/04/publishing-schedule/ (Oct. 4, 2008) (reviewing criticisms by Shyam Sunder (Yale Univ.), Ray Ball (Univ. of Chicago), J.
Edward Ketz (Penn State Univ.), Tom Selling (Thunderbird Sch. of Global Mgmt.,
emeritus), Bob Jensen (Trinity Univ., emeritus), and David Albrecht (Bowling Green
State Univ.)).
6
See Cunningham, supra note 1, at 27–28.
7
Roadmap for the Potential Use of Financial Statements Prepared in Accordance
with International Financial Reporting Standards by U.S. Issuers, Exchange Act Release No. 33-8982, 73 Fed. Reg. 70,816 (proposed Nov. 21, 2008), reprinted in [2002 to
Current Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 88,409 (Nov. 14, 2008) [hereinafter 2008 Roadmap].
8
See A Roadmap for Convergence between IFRSs and US GAAP—2006–2008:
Memorandum of Understanding between the FASB and the IASB, Feb. 27, 2006,
http://www.iasb.org/NR/rdonlyres/874B63FB-56DB-4B78-B7AF-49BBA18C98D9/
0/MoU.pdf (last visited Feb. 20, 2009).
9
James D. Cox, Coping in a Global Marketplace: Survival Strategies for a 75-YearOld SEC, 95 Va. L. Rev. 941, 985 (2009).
10
Id. at 985–86.
11
Id.
5
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take this opportunity to follow up his paper with some amplifying
points along similar lines.
The SEC’s reports respecting these convergence initiatives talk
the globalization talk, extolling the benefits of convergence. We
read that standardization yields cost savings12 and that a single
global set of reporting standards yields an ultimate gain in comparability.13 Both facilitate the search for global opportunities by U.S.
investors14 and make U.S. capital markets more attractive to foreign issuers.15 But, as so often is the case with globalization talk,
things get left out. We discuss two of them here.16
First, this is not just a matter of choosing the framework for standard setting. The accounting treatments themselves are at issue,
treatments that for the most part concern domestic reporting firms
and domestic users of financial statements. This may seem obvious,
as a change of standard setter means different standards and the
change would extend to domestic companies. But the Roadmap
spends only three of its 165 pages comparing IFRS to GAAP.17 We
take the occasion to fill in some missing details, including a treatment-by-treatment comparison of GAAP and IFRS in the Appendix. We go on to discuss the implications of such differences.
The familiar debate over the relative merits rules and principles
captures many of the matters at stake, which takes us to our second
point of amplification. The rules versus principles comparison only
has meaning in context, which includes not only the compliance
environment, but also the political and interest group alignments
surrounding the standard setter.18 These matters tend to be assumed away in recent globalization discussions. The discussants
treat standard-setter independence as an accomplished fact on
both sides of the Atlantic, an assumption that became widespread
after the IASB was reorganized during the last decade to acquire a
12

2007 Concept Release, supra note 3, ¶ 45,604.
Id. ¶ 45,606; 2008 Roadmap, supra note 7, ¶ 70,823.
14
2008 Roadmap, supra note 7, ¶ 70,818.
15
Id. ¶ 70,824 (asserting that a U.S. dual standard “may create challenges in the U.S.
capital markets”).
16
For discussion of additional points, see Cunningham, supra note 1.
17
2008 Roadmap, supra note 7, ¶ 70,826–27.
18
See generally Lawrence A. Cunningham, A Prescription to Retire the Rhetoric of
“Principles-Based Systems” in Corporate Law, Securities Regulation, and Accounting, 60 Vand. L. Rev. 1411 (2007).
13
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governance structure that closely resembles the FASB’s structure.19
Politics do not retreat so easily, however. The FASB maintained its
independence during its thirty-five-year history in the teeth of opposition from corporate management. As the independent FASB
formulated more and more standards, management experienced a
steady diminution of its zone of financial reporting discretion. A
switch to IFRS would allow management to reclaim some of the
lost territory. Thus, the Roadmap sends an implicit political signal.
The interest group alignment that protected the FASB, comprised
of auditing firms, actors in the financial markets, and the SEC, has
disintegrated as U.S. capital market power has waned in the face of
international competition. Management is the shift’s incidental
beneficiary, with possible negative effects for domestic markets.
I. COMPARING TREATMENTS UNDER GAAP AND IFRS
The Appendix sets out a treatment-by-treatment comparison of
cases where GAAP and IFRS establish different standards. We selected the treatments for salience based on our own judgment and
experience.20 If we went treatment by treatment through the list, we
19

For a discussion of the governance issues and process that led to IASB’s reorganization, see David S. Ruder et al., Creation of World Wide Accounting Standards:
Convergence and Independence, 25 Nw. J. Int’l L. & Bus. 513, 526–54 (2005).
It should be noted that IASB does not yet meet the criteria established under the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, §§ 108(b)–109, 116 Stat. 745, 768-69
(codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77s, 7219 (2006)) for SEC recognition, because it is not
funded by Congressionally levied fees. FASB, long supported by private contributions, came to be funded by fees levied on public companies under § 108 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. IASB, in contrast, remains privately funded and implicitly beholden
to the business and accounting interests that provide the money. For discussion of
other possible problems under the requirements, see Cunningham, supra note 1, at
29–33.
The Roadmap discusses the funding problem. To circumvent this problem, IASB is
working with the International Organization of Securities Commissions to form an
international Monitoring Group made up of representatives of various national regulators. See 2008 Roadmap, supra note 7, ¶ 70,821–22.
20
More exhaustive lists are available. See, e.g., Barry J. Epstein & Eva K. Jermakowicz, Wiley IFRS 2008: Interpretation and Application of International Financial Reporting Standards app. C at 26–31 (2008). Large accounting firms also have compiled
booklets describing treatment differences. See, e.g., Deloitte, IRFSs and US GAAP:
A
Pocket
Comparison
(2008),
available
at
http://www.deloitte.com/
dtt/cda/doc/content/us_assurance_IFRS_US_comparison2008.pdf; Deloitte, IFRSs in
Your Pocket: An IAS Plus Guide (2008), available at http://www.deloitte.com/
dtt/cda/doc/content/pocket2008%284%29.pdf; Ernst & Young, US GAAP v. IFRS
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would prefer the GAAP treatment in a majority of cases, but also
would articulate good reasons to support a number of the IFRS
treatments. Whatever the preferences of particular observers respecting particular treatments, a scan of the list reveals a fundamental problem with the current “either/or” policy discussion over
the choice of systems. Only the accountants themselves are capable
of addressing the matters at stake in an informed way.21 The policymakers trade in characterizations.
The SEC’s characterization, set out in the Roadmap, describes
IFRS as “not as prescriptive” as GAAP and as holding out “a
greater amount of options” while providing “a relatively lesser
amount of guidance.”22 The SEC notes that greater optionality (to
borrow its term) could detract from consistency and comparability
and make litigation and enforcement outcomes harder to predict.23
At the same time, it notes that relaxed prescription may make it

The Basics (2008); PriceWaterhouseCoopers, Similarities and Differences: A Comparison of IFRS and US GAAP, available at http://www.pwc.com/gx/eng/about/
svcs/corporatereporting/SandD_07.pdf (Oct. 2007).
21
Accounting experts tend to agree, as an empirical matter, that applying GAAP
versus IFRS results in significant bottom line reporting differences. See Cox, supra
note 9, at 948. We note that they also disagree on the normative policy implications of
the data. Consider literature reviews and policy analysis by two distinguished committees of the American Accounting Association, the preeminent academic accounting
body in the United States. Authors of the two studies agree that the empirical evidence indicates that significant differences exist in reported accounting results when
applying the two standards, including the bottom line balance sheet and
income statement aggregates. Yet the two draw different conclusions, one
encouraging competition among multiple standards and the other cautioning that
moving the United States to IFRS is premature. Compare Karim Jamal et al.,
Am. Accounting Ass’n Fin. Accounting Standards Comm., A Perspective on
the SEC’s Proposal to Accept Financial Statements Prepared in Accordance
with
International
Financial
Reporting
Standards
(IFRS)
Without
Reconciliation to U.S. GAAP (2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1020408 (finding differences in outcomes but no evidence of
relative superiority and therefore concluding that competition among the standards is
optimal policy stance), with Patrick E. Hopkins et al., Am. Accounting Ass’n Fin. Reporting Policy Committee, Response to the SEC Release: Acceptance from Foreign
Private Issuers of Financial Statements Prepared in Accordance with International
Financial Reporting Standards Without Reconciliation to U.S. GAAP (2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1083679 (finding material
differences in outcomes that are relevant to investment decisions and therefore concluding that it is premature for the United States to adopt IFRS).
22
2008 Roadmap, supra note 7, ¶ 70,826.
23
Id.
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easier for issuers to account for transactions in accordance with
their underlying economics.24 Thus, the SEC at its bottom line
frames the matters at stake within the rules versus principles discourse, taking the occasion to advocate principles.25 But we also
note a tension in the SEC’s framework: whatever international
comparability enhancement the Roadmap holds out implies a sacrifice of comparability in the domestic context. The SEC’s stated
goal is inherently elusive.26
The Appendix contains some classic exemplars where GAAP is
famous for rules while IFRS is known for principles. Consider first
accounting for capital leases—long-term leases that must be
booked on the lessee’s balance sheet (Appendix § VIII). GAAP
breaks out four defined criteria, including one by-the-numbers test
keyed to the useful life of the asset under lease, with the criteria
determining the treatment. IFRS bids the reporting company to
look to the economics of the transaction, including eight factors to
assist its determination without stipulating results following from
their application.27 It bears noting that while IFRS is indeed more
flexible, the GAAP treatment, founded on a list of factors, does
not determine results on a stand-alone basis. American lawyers
would describe both treatments as “standards.”
Now turn to accounting consolidation (Appendix § X), probably
the most frequently cited case of GAAP as rules and IFRS as principles. Under both GAAP and IFRS, when one firm “controls”
another, both report on a consolidated basis. GAAP largely defines control with a by-the-numbers test: consolidation follows
from ownership of fifty percent plus one share of the subsidiary’s
stock. But, the inference of control can be rebutted where control
actually is not held or is temporary.28 IFRS begins with a fifty percent plus one share test as well, but modifies the zone of control
under a standard that variously looks to other arrangements re24

Id.
For a more detailed discussion of SEC pronouncements articulated under previous SEC leadership, see Cunningham, supra note 18, at 1446–53.
26
See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Editorial, Beware the Temptation of Global Standards, Fin. Times, Sept. 10, 2007, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/1d612b96-5fc3-11dc-b0fe0000779fd2ac.html.
27
Epstein & Jermakowicz, supra note 20, at 533–35.
28
Fin. Accounting Standards Bd., Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No.
94: Consolidation of Majority Owned Subsidiaries ¶¶ 10, 13 (1987).
25
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specting voting shares, contractual arrangements, and regulatory
contexts. Application of the standard can cut either way, turning
less than fifty-one percent ownership into control or rejecting a
finding of control given more than fifty percent.29 The
rules/principles distinction once again is descriptive of the difference. But a caution about the description of GAAP once again is in
order: the fifty-plus-one presumption is rebuttable under both systems.
IFRS accords reporting companies more elbow room in both of
the above cases, but a dispassionate search for economic truth is
not its only normative motivation. To get a fuller picture of the issues at stake, compare the treatments for tangible long-lived assets
(Appendix § VII). Under GAAP, they are carried on a cost basis.
If the asset’s value is impaired, the impairment results in a charge
to current income. Under IFRS, the asset may be carried at cost or
fair value. If the asset’s value is impaired, the loss is dealt with by a
balance sheet adjustment only. Moreover, if the asset’s value recovers after the impairment, the balance sheet adjustment can (and
in some circumstances must) be reversed. Here we see that GAAP
is motivated by conservatism, the practice of dealing with uncertainty through asymmetric recognition of losses compared to
gains.30 It also favors verifiable numbers, thereby hewing more
closely to traditional cost accounting and constraining management’s “optionality” respecting balance sheet presentations. IFRS,
being more comfortable about extending management discretion
to revalue assets, includes a broader range of fair value treatments,
introducing subjectivity into the determination of balance sheet
amounts. Thus, under GAAP, when a tangible asset is written
down, the write-down is forever, while under IFRS, tangible asset
values can go up and down with exterior shifts in valuation as management determines.
Note also that in the case of a decline in value, GAAP forces
recognition on the income statement, while IFRS lets the company
take care of the matter with a balance sheet adjustment.

29

Epstein & Jermakowicz, supra note 20, at 441–42.
See Sudipta Basu, The Conservatism Principle and the Asymmetric Timeliness of
Earnings, 24 J. Acct. & Econ. 3 (1997).
30
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This difference also applies more generally. GAAP is income
statement oriented because it evolved as a system responsive to the
demands of equity holders in U.S. financial markets.31 When
GAAP requires an event to make an impact on the income statement, it in effect flags the event for actors valuing the company.
IFRS, with its ties to block-holder regimes, favors the balance
sheet, reflecting the greater influence of other constituents, in particular bank creditors and employees.32
Now compare the treatments for research and development expenses (Appendix § VIII). Under GAAP, these are expensed in
the period incurred, and cash outflows are classified into the operating section of the cash flow statement. Under IFRS, research and
development costs are capitalized; that is, the company books the
costs as an asset and shows them on its cash flow statement as investment cash flows. A basic policy difference again is manifest:
under GAAP, conservatism is a motivating principle, and doubts
tend to be resolved by forcing a present deduction on the income
statement. IFRS is more liberal and management-friendly, assuming that research and development results in tangible economic
value and delaying recognition of its costs for an extended future.
We now turn to revenue recognition (Appendix § IV), once
again to see conservatism in action in GAAP. Given a service contract to be performed over multiple reporting periods, IFRS lets a
company recognize all the revenue up front upon partial performance. GAAP, taking the idea that revenues should be matched to
expenses more seriously, amortizes these contracts over the period
of service without up-front recognition. (We note that the IFRS
approach bears a more than passing resemblance to the treatment
that Enron Corporation received from FASB’s Emerging Issues
31

For more discussion on the evolution of IFRS, see infra text accompanying notes
35–38.
32
See Cunningham, supra note 1, at 48. There is a parallel dark side to this. In the
United States, accounting manipulation generally affects the income statement, with
earnings per share being a key factor in the compensation of the corporate insiders
responsible. In block-holder countries, manipulation tends to affect the balance sheet,
with payoffs to the insiders responsible stemming from the allocation of corporate assets. Id. (citing John C. Coffee, Jr., A Theory of Corporate Scandals: Why the U.S.
and Europe Differ, 21 Oxford Rev. Econ. Pol’y 198, 199 (2005); Simon Johnson et al.,
Tunneling, 90 Am. Econ. Rev. 22 (2000)); see also Vladimir Atanasov et al., Unbundling and Measuring Tunneling (Univ. of Tex. Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 117,
2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1030529.
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Task force, under which it was permitted to show all gains from its
long-term energy contracts up-front.33) A similar comparison obtains respecting accounting for pension obligations. Under GAAP,
unfunded pension benefit obligations must be shown as liabilities
on the balance sheet. IFRS requires no balance sheet disclosure.
Once again, conservatism motivates GAAP, while managers get
the benefit of the doubt under IFRS.
Finally, we turn to inventory accounting (Appendix § VI), an
area where GAAP is the more flexible of the two regimes. For cost
accounting purposes, one must make an assumption about the order in which goods are sold. They are either treated as sold in the
direct order of production or acquisition (first-in-first-out or FIFO)
or as sold in reverse order of production or acquisition (last-infirst-out or LIFO). Given rising prices, FIFO more closely reflects
economic reality on the balance sheet, listing inventories close to
current values, while LIFO better reflects prevailing economics on
the income statement with a figure for cost of goods sold reflecting
current prices. GAAP permits companies to choose; IFRS, with its
regime of balance sheet primacy, requires FIFO.
The above comparison confirms the SEC’s description—GAAP
constrains, where IFRS is flexible—but does so with the noted
qualifications. The flexibility, as Professor Cox notes, follows in
part from the nature of the enterprise.34 A one-size-fits-all set of
global standards of necessity emerges as a big tent so that a range
of national practices can be accommodated. We think that comparison also serves to show that there are values at stake—namely,
conservatism, verifiability, and transparent disclosure of current
period results. None of these is calculated to appeal to managers,
nor do they hold out much popular appeal when the stock market
is booming. But, right now, in the wake of financial collapse, risk
aversion returns to the fore not only in boardrooms, but also in the
minds of policymakers. Those pursuing the Roadmap over the next

33

See Emerging Issues Task Force (“EITF”) Issue 02-3: Issues involved in Accounting for Derivative Contracts Held for Trading Purposes and Involved in Energy Trading and Risk Management Activities (Mar. 20, 2003) (discussing the rescission of
EITF Issue 98-10: Accounting for Contracts Involved in Energy Trading and Risk
Management Activities).
34
See Cox, supra note 9, at 947.
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few years may have a more difficult trip than its progenitors project.
The globe-spanning flexibility of IFRS also reflects differences in
corporate governance systems and financial market regulation.
IFRS’s predecessor systems all developed in small national marketplaces with tight communities of intermediaries and investor
populations largely made up of institutions. Tight communities can
co-exist with “light touch” regulation, and as between GAAP and
IFRS, the latter is the “light[] touch” choice.35
But the differences in surrounding regulatory regimes are
wrought into the systems. As an example, consider the U.K. requirement that, if necessary for the presentation of a true and fair
view of the business, a particular mandated treatment must be
overridden.36 IFRS’s stated preference for treatments that follow
from the economics of the transaction partakes of the same spirit.
Overrides have not been the practice in the United States, even as
financials must “fairly present” the company’s financial position.
Litigation risk is the reason,37 not GAAP. Litigation risk is a property of the U.S. adversary regulatory system, a system that, unlike
that of the United Kingdom, evolved to cope with a dispersed, continent-wide array of financial institutions and investor clients.
In addition, most of the countries in the IFRS fold have blockholder governance systems—the United Kingdom, Australia, and
Israel being the exceptions. Blockholders, having control or influence over internal decisionmaking, suffer diminished problems of
agency and information asymmetry.38 Any question arising under a
discretionary treatment can be answered by direct inquiry. Accounting principles accordingly matter less than they do given the
separation of ownership and control that prevails in the United
States.
Thus did GAAP develop into the more constraining system as a
result of political and institutional factors unique to U.S. capital
35

Donald C. Langevoort, U.S. Securities Law and Global Competition, 13, (Georgetown
Univ.
Law
Ctr.,
Working
Paper,
2008),
available
at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1313133.
36
See Cunningham, supra note 1, at 41–42.
37
Id. at 42.
38
William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, Comparative Corporate Governance
and the Theory of the Firm: The Case Against Global Cross Reference, 38 Colum. J.
Transnat’l L. 213, 226 (1999).
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markets. All of these factors remain pertinent in the present policy
context, even as potential gains from global convergence introduce
a complicating factor. Part II offers a more particular description of
the environment in which FASB and GAAP evolved.
II. THE POLITICS OF GAAP
The FASB came into existence thirty-five years ago as the result
of an ad hoc process looking toward the establishment of a viable
standard setter under private auspices. The accountants’ professional organization, the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (“AICPA”), took the lead,39 with input from organizations and individuals representing management and the financial
sector.40 The organizers had a high-powered incentive. They
wanted a responsive standard setter without ceding territory to a
federal agency,41 which in those days was associated with domination by progressive, anti-corporate types.42
Public legitimacy mattered, so the new standard setter had to be
independent, public regarding, and insulated from political pressure,43 yet simultaneously responsive to constituent interests.44 The
result was a board selected by an independent foundation, itself
populated with constituents, along with a monitoring advisory
body, also populated with constituents.45 Today the IASB is a car-

39
Ronald King & Gregory Waymire, Accounting Standard-Setting Institutions and
the Governance of Incomplete Contracts, 9 J. Acct. Auditing & Fin. 579, 583–86
(1994).
40
Robert Van Riper, Setting Standards for Financial Reporting: FASB and the
Struggle for Control of a Critical Process 8–9 (1994); Mohamed Elmuttassim Hussein
& J. Edward Ketz, Accounting Standards-Setting in the U.S.: An Analysis of Power
and Social Exchange, 10 J. Acct. & Pub. Pol’y 59, 76 (1991).
41
The federal securities laws directed the SEC to prescribe the form and content of
financial statements. See generally, Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat.
74 (1934) (codified as amended 15 U.S.C. § 77, § 77s). For a review of the legislative
history, see Sean M. O’Connor, Be Careful What You Wish For: How Accountants
and Congress Created the Problem of Auditor Independence, 45 B.C. L. Rev. 741,
789–820 (2004). The SEC then turned the matter over to the AICPA. Van Riper, supra note 40, at 7.
42
See Van Riper, supra note 40, at 9.
43
Id.
44
See Robert Chatov, Corporate Financial Reporting: Public or Private Control?
232–39 (1975).
45
Van Riper, supra note 40, at 13–18.
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bon copy, but for a larger cast of characters and geographic distribution requirements.46
The FASB’s governance model, now replicated at the IASB,
pursues a middle way that has aroused political objections both on
the right and on the left. From the right, public choice commentators have denounced the arrangements surrounding the FASB as a
rent-seeking scam. From this point of view, the FASB, which
should have operated as a private standard setter subject to free
competition, has from the beginning worked instead as a cog in the
larger machine of the federal disclosure system, the mandates of
which yield rents to auditing firms.47 Extrapolating, following the
Roadmap to substitute the IASB only make matters worse, taking
an unsatisfactory domestic arrangement and embedding it on a
global basis.
A second set of critics attacked from the progressive, pluralist
left. For them, choices of accounting principles have significant allocative consequences; therefore, accounting standard setting is a
high stakes game in which the setter has no alternative but to balance interests.48 Because the setter resolves political rather than
technical issues, its legitimacy depends on political responsiveness.49 The FASB, at its inception, could not provide this because it
depended on contributions from the preparers and auditors, groups
with high stakes in all of its outcomes.50 The critics thus contended
that the standard setter should be an agency directly responsible to
Congress.51 Substituting the IASB only makes things worse from

46

See 2007 Concept Release, supra note 3 ¶ 45,605; Ruder et al., supra note 19, at
519–20; see also Intern’l Accounting Standards Bd, IASB and the
IASC Foundation: Who We Are and What We Do, available at
http://www.iasb.org/NR/rdonlyres/95C54002-7796-4E23A32728D23D2F55EA/0/
WhoWeAre_Revise5Feb09.pdf (last visited Mar. 10, 2009).
47
See Ross L. Watts & Jerold L. Zimmerman, The Demand for and Supply of Accounting Theories: The Market for Excuses, 54 Acct. Rev. 273, 275–81 (1979).
48
See Van Riper, supra note 40, at 73–74.
49
See id. at 22–23.
50
See id. at 14; Staff of Subcomm. on Reports, Accounting & Mgmt., S. Comm. on
Gov’t Operations, 94th Cong., Staff Study: The Accounting Establishment 1–2
(Comm. Print 1976) [hereinafter The Accounting Establishment].
51
See Van Riper, supra note 40, at 45 (proposing in particular the General Accounting Office). The obvious choice, the SEC, delegated the standard-setting function to
the private sector early in its history. For a critical discussion, see George Mundstock,
The Trouble with FASB, 28 N.C. J. Int’l L. & Com. Reg. 813, 825–26, 839–41 (2003).
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this point of view as well, because it removes a political subject
matter to a distant venue in which U.S. domestic concerns occupy
at best a secondary place on the agenda.52
The public choice critique has never had much political traction.
The progressive attack did have an impact in the FASB’s early
years and prompted process reforms that strengthened the FASB’s
public bona fides, particularly in a trend toward ever-increasing
distance from the AICPA.53 It too has lost salience in recent years.
But the FASB soon enough encountered a third enemy in the form
of the same corporate managers who had been at the table at its inception. This is the one group of critics that would welcome IFRS.
The FASB crossed management when it took up its initial project to articulate generally accepted goals of accounting. The project, eventually called the Conceptual Framework, is a set of principles much derided for its high level of generality.54 But the
Conceptual Framework did lay down at least one outcome determinative point,55 which lies in a single unprepossessing sentence in
Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 1: “Financial reporting should provide information that is useful to present and
potential investors and creditors and other users in making rational
investment, credit, and similar decisions.”56 This is called decision
usefulness, and it seems to state the obvious. But back in the 1970s
it was radical stuff.57
Financial reporting in fact serves two purposes: it imports external transparency and also serves as a part of a rational system of internal management.58 Three decades ago, the prevailing concept of
purpose, called “stewardship,” encompassed both purposes.59 It
52

2008 Roadmap, supra note 7, at 70,846–47 (recognizing that substitution of IFRS
for GAAP implies diminished influence for U.S. interests).
53
See Van Riper, supra note 40, at 14–15, 46–47, 86–87, 126.
54
See id. at 80; Stephen A. Zeff, A Perspective on the U.S. Public/Private-Sector
Approach to the Regulation of Financial Reporting, 9 Acct. Horizons 52, 52, 60
(1995).
55
See John C. Burton, A Commentary on the Reflections of Homer Kripke, 4 J.
Acct. Auditing & Fin. 79, 80 (1989).
56
See FASB, Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 1: Objectives of Financial Reporting of Business Enterprises ¶ 34 (1978), available at
http://www.fasb.org/pdf/con1.pdf.
57
See Van Riper, supra note 40, at 20.
58
See Watts & Zimmerman, supra note 47, at 296–97.
59
Id. at 296.
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meant that corporate managers had a place at the table with market actors as important users of the standards. Indeed, they
claimed primacy.60
When the FASB elevated the status of outside users of financials
with decision usefulness,61 it broke with history and defected
against management. It thereby also succeeded in protecting its
own independence, avoiding the pluralist alternative of regulation
as mediation in a world of multiple constituents with varied and
conflicting preferences.62 Decision usefulness also imported policy
legitimacy, implying a one-size-fits-all theoretical justification for
the enterprise as a whole. Back in the 1970s, management was
peddling national competitiveness and public welfare to argue for a
cost-benefit burden of proof to be met by every new accounting
standard63—an argument that later would register in the Congress
with respect to SEC rulemaking64 and still registers in today’s convergence discussions. The Conceptual Framework’s focus on markets let the FASB argue back, first, that information is a public
good that will be underprovided absent regulation,65 and, second,
that standards directed to user utility reduce the social costs of information asymmetry, which include high transaction costs and
thin capital markets with low liquidity.66
Decision usefulness also aligned the FASB’s goals with that of
its governmental overseer, the SEC, and the SEC’s goal of investor
protection.67 The two agencies maintained a cooperative relationship that worked well, at least until recently. The SEC’s recent defection against the FASB also amounts to a defection from decision usefulness. A shift to IFRS, with its constituency-responsive
60

See Van Riper, supra note 40, at 21.
See FASB, supra note 56, ¶¶ 27, 32.
62
See Baruch Lev, Toward a Theory of Equitable and Efficient Accounting Policy,
63 Acct. Rev. 1, 2, 13 (1988).
63
See R. K. Mautz & William G. May, Financial Disclosure in a Competitive Economy: Considerations in Establishing Financial Accounting Standards 1–4 (1978) (presenting a project of the Financial Executives Research Foundation).
64
See National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996, § 106(a)(2), 15 U.S.C.
§ 77b(b) (2006).
65
See FASB, Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 2: Qualitative Characteristics of Accounting ¶ 135 (1980), available at http://www.fasb.org/pdf/con2.pdf;
Lev, supra note 62, at 8–9.
66
Lev, supra note 62, at 4–9.
67
See Van Riper, supra note 40, at 141.
61
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stress on balance sheet treatments and de-emphasis of income
statement responsiveness, would amount to a move back in the direction of stewardship.
Meanwhile, management has never been happy with GAAP.
Because the FASB has independently sets its own agenda, management has seen a classic case of an unresponsive agency promulgating regulations for their own sake.68 Management voices use the
FASB’s notice and comment and advisory processes to object but
get only occasional concessions as FASB keeps cranking out standards they would just as soon do without.69 Management also complains of excess complexity, but not when it likes the bottom line
result.70 The managers call the overall result “standards overload,”71
and recommend shifting agenda control to a new oversight board
with power to block agenda items and force revision of existing
standards.72
Though management’s agenda reform proposals have never
gone anywhere, it has scored occasional victories in its long battle
with the FASB. On occasion, it has used its political muscle to
block proposed standards. It also secured two seats on the FASB,
and, for a while, a super majority voting regime that made it harder
for the FASB to adopt new standards.73
Management’s complaint of excess complexity collapses into the
more serious and widespread complaint that the FASB drafts too
many rules, seeking to supply a clear answer to every possible
situation, pursuing the objective with detailed statements, bright
line tests, and multiple exceptions.74 This complaint returns us to
the SEC Roadmap’s justification for doing away with the FASB altogether and so bears importantly in the present context.

68

See Dennis R. Beresford, How Should the FASB Be Judged? 9 Acct. Horizons 56,
56–57 (1995).
69
Van Riper, supra note 40, at 98–99, 118–31, 183; Beresford, supra note 68, at 59.
70
Van Riper, supra note 40, at 110; Beresford, supra note 68, at 60.
71
See Van Riper, supra note 40, at 137; Beresford, supra note 68, at 60.
72
Van Riper, supra note 40, at 119–23; Beresford, supra note 68, at 57.
73
Van Riper, supra note 40, at 126, 150, 154.
74
See Sec. Exch. Comm’n, Study Pursuant to Section 108(d) of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002 on the Adoption by the United States Financial Reporting System of a
Principles-Based Accounting System, § I.C (2003) [hereinafter 2003 SEC Report],
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/principlesbasedstand.htm (last visited
Feb. 1, 2009).
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There is no question that GAAP’s layers of rules can have perverse effects. Internal inconsistency can result.75 Comparability also
can suffer: reporting entities under the same strict standard can appear comparable on the faces of their financials when their arrangements in fact are dissimilar.76 Worse, there results a dysfunctional, check-the-box approach to compliance that admits
transaction structuring and other strategic behavior, along with
rule compliant statements that do not fairly state the reporting
company’s results or financial position.77
Actors at the FASB reply that the rules follow from demands
generated by managers and auditors looking for treatment and
scope exceptions and “roadmaps” that hold out “guidance.”78 It
says it is sorry, but it is just being a responsive regulator and does
not exercise total control over outcomes.79 But this posture of accommodation also has a dark side, for it is here that the public
choice critique registers with full force. The securities laws’ requirement of an independent audit makes the large audit firms
providers of a necessary service, positioning them to collect rents.80
Complex, rules-based standards aid and abet the rent seeking, generating work,81 and over time strengthening entry barriers.82 Moreover, innovations get choked off to the extent that they decrease
auditability and expose the firms to legal risk.83
All of this is true, but, given the pressures that have come to
bear on the FASB, it is difficult to imagine a different evolutionary
course for GAAP. In effect, the FASB has had to take our secondbest world as it finds it. It is a nasty place where incentive problems
75

Id. § I.G.
Id.
77
Id.; Katherine Schipper, Principles-Based Accounting Standards, 17 Acct. Horizons 61, 68 (2003).
78
See Van Riper, supra note 40, at 105.
79
See Lawrence W. Smith, The FASB’s Efforts Toward Simplification, FASB Rep.,
Feb. 28, 2005, at 2, 3–4.
80
See George J. Bentson, The Regulation of Accountants and Public Accounting
Before and After Enron, 52 Emory L.J. 1325, 1329–31 (2003).
81
See Charles R. Plott & Shyam Sunder, A Synthesis, 19 J. Acct. Res. 227, 231
(Supp. 1981).
82
See Dale Buckmaster et al., Measuring Lobbying Influence Using the Financial
Accounting Standards Board Public Record, 20 J. Econ. & Soc. Measurement 331,
340 (1994).
83
See Mundstock, supra note 51, at 817.
76
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impair the auditor-client relationship, auditability does matter, and
the standard setter has to worry about scandal prevention.84 Rules,
although not ideal, have advantages because they provide a base of
common assumptions and knowledge for preparers, auditors, and
users. They decrease differences in measurement; they make noncompliance more evident. And, as room for differences in judgment narrows, transparency and comparability are enhanced.85
GAAP, then, has followed from defensible tradeoffs.
The institutional conditions that led to the tradeoffs will not
magically disappear upon substitution of IFRS. It is therefore hard
to predict benefits to domestic statement users from its principles
and stress on fair presentation. As to management, however, benefits easily can be predicted.
III. IMPLICATIONS
So, despite the problems, the FASB put itself on history’s winning side with decision usefulness.86 It thereby aligned itself not
only with the SEC but also with the broader economic shift away
from managerialism toward capital market governance under the
shareholder value norm. The story of GAAP’s evolution is thus a
story about standard setting in the U.S. markets, where separated
ownership and control predominate, and tensions between managers and shareholders are exhaustively worked out in regulation and
litigation. The FASB opted for conservatism, verifiability, and
rules because it operates in this environment, not because of some
refractory, academic commitment to an outmoded approach to
standard setting. The IASB, with its shorter history and different
regulatory context, has pursued different values. Accordingly, it is
not enough to describe it as “independent” and there end the convergence discussion in its favor. Viewed against this background,
IFRS must look like an improvement to management, perhaps
even if switching costs in the form of higher audit fees turns out to
84
See William W. Bratton, Rules, Principles, and the Accounting Crisis in the
United States, 5 Eur. Bus. Org. L. Rev. 7, 14–18 (2004) (describing advantages of
rules in the auditing context).
85
See Schipper, supra note 77, at 68.
86
For further discussion, see William W. Bratton, Private Standards, Public Governance: A New Look at the Financial Accounting Standards Board, 48 B.C. L. Rev.
5 (2007).
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be onerous. This is not because U.S. management can expect to
dominate the IASB where it has failed to dominate the FASB. The
IASB also has earned a reputation for independence.87 Moreover,
given the IASB’s broader, global roster of constituents, any particular demands emanating from a single national interest group or
regulator are bound to resound less forcefully than would occur in
a domestic standard-setting context. The advantage for management lies in the elbow room imported by a shift to a shorter, less
directive stack of standards. A shift to IFRS thus ameliorates the
problem of “standards overload” in one swoop. Indeed, given one
global standard setter and national governments and interest
groups worldwide, it might prove quite difficult for IASB to crank
out new standards.
Why, then, this abrupt concession to management after U.S. accounting’s three-decade-long history of privileging the user interest? The answer is that the prevailing interest group alignment
changed markedly in the post-Sarbanes-Oxley political economy.
GAAP has come to be seen as one of the deadweight domestic
regulatory costs that make U.S. capital markets unattractive to foreign firms. Thus has the SEC, looking to lighten its touch, abandoned a client that it had long protected. Market intermediaries,
long quietly aligned with the FASB,88 also appear to have crossed
over as new listing business has gone to London, Singapore, and
Hong Kong. Ominously, the audit firms seem to be lining up
against the FASB as well, angling to get new litigation defenses out
of the deal89 and perhaps looking forward to collecting switching
fees.
87

It famously held its ground against the French banks and their government on fair
value treatment on macro-hedging. See Ruder et al., supra note 19, at 579–86. More
recently, however, IASB’s reputation became tarnished when it relented to EU pressure to match U.S. adjustments respecting mark-to-market accounting of distressed
debt securities in bank portfolios. See, e.g., Phillip Inman, UK Accounting Watchdog
Threatens to Quit over EU Rule Change, Guardian, Nov. 12, 2008, at 26 (describing
the resultant threat to resign of Sir David Tweedie, the IASB’s chairman).
88
See Van Riper, supra note 40, at 98.
89
See U.S. Dept. of Treasury Advisory Comm. on the Auditing Profession, Final
Report app. C 3–4 (2008) (appending remarks of U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry
Paulson connecting globalization and international financial reporting standards with
legal burdens auditors face); id. at VII.23–VII.32 (reviewing disagreement among
Committee members on a wide range of litigation defenses and legal protections that
auditing firms sought in a comprehensive review of issues facing the profession, in-
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We think the SEC is making the classic mistake of a regulator
facing its first reversal because of jurisdictional competition. The
earlier domination of U.S. equity markets gave the United States
the privilege of imposing its own terms on foreign entities.90 The
United States cannot do that anymore and a question is posed:
should the United States continue to go its own way or reconstitute
its markets so as to catch the at-the-margin consumers now listing
securities elsewhere? In addressing such a question, it is important
not to panic.91 The past cannot be recaptured, and something must
be sacrificed. And, competition in global securities market not being the same thing as competition in a market for widgets; costs
and benefits do not automatically signal catering to the marginal
consumer. Protecting domestic markets must be weighed against
global market share. Therefore, as between the Roadmap and staying the course with the existing process of letting the FASB and the
IASB iron out as many differences as the can, we prefer the latter
course.92
Finally, opting for IFRS requires defining a framework for relations between the SEC and the IASB. The United States could follow the EU and reserve a right to endorse new IFRS promulgations, standard by standard, or take a more deferential posture
toward the IASB.93 The choice presumably will be influenced by a
yet to be determined pattern of relations between IASB, the International Organization of Securities Commissions, and the global
roster of participating national governments.
Whichever choice is made, we predict that conflicts will arise.
Given conflicts and an IASB that proves impervious to U.S. intercluding effects of globalization and movement towards international financial reporting standards), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/domestic-finance/acap/docs/
final-report.pdf.
90
See generally, Chris Brummer, Stock Exchanges and the New Market for Securities Law, 75 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1435 (2008).
91
Cf. William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, The New Economics of Jurisdictional Competition: Devolutionary Federalism in a Second-Best World, 86 Geo. L.J.
201, 264–65 (1997) (describing “scare talk” deployments of jurisdictional competition
theory).
92
Perhaps the SEC’s ultimate purpose is to give FASB a push to move that process
along. But if so, this cannot be a good way to apply pressure. To the extent the
GAAP/IASB convergence process entails bargaining, it makes no sense to pull
trumps from the national hand.
93
See Cunningham, supra note 1, at 13, 26–31.
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ests, whether articulated by management, users, or the SEC, a new
domestic politics of accounting standard setting will emerge. The
threshold question will be whether the U.S. national interest counsels departure from IFRS with consequent sacrifice of comparability and increase in compliance costs. In light of the contentious history of GAAP, we predict that the comparability line inevitably
will be crossed. Once that happens, U.S. IFRS will begin a long,
painful process of reverting to U.S. GAAP.
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APPENDIX
Topic

GAAP

IFRS

I. General
Departures/
overrides

94

Allowed in theory; rare in
practice94

Allowed95

See AICPA, Code of Professional Conduct, Rule 203, available at
http://www.aicpa.org/about/code/et_203.html; FASB, Proposal: Principles-Based Approach to U.S. Standard Setting, File Reference No. 1125-001, 7 n.5 (Oct. 21, 2002),
available at http://www.fasb.org/proposals/principles-based_approach.pdf.
95
See IASB, International Accounting Standard (“IAS”) 1, Presentation of Financial Statements, ¶¶ 17–22; Principles-Based Approach, supra note 94, 7 n.5.
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96

II. Income Statements
Classification
of
“extraordinary
items”
Restructuring
costs

96

Allowed97

Prohibited (unusual items
can be segregated)98

Recognized when
little discretion to avoid costs
exists (mostly when
incurred)99

Recognized when
announced or
commenced100

For US GAAP, see generally SEC Regulation S-X, 17 C.F.R. § 210 (2008); FASB,
Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts (“CON”) 1, Objectives of Financial Reporting by Business Enterprises; CON 2, Qualitative Characteristics of Accounting
Information; CON 3, Elements of Financial Statements of Business Enterprises; CON
4, Objectives of Financial Reporting by Nonbusiness Organizations; CON 5, Recognition and Measurement in Financial Statements of Business Enterprises; CON 6, Elements of Financial Statements; CON 7, Using Cash Flow Information and Present
Value in Accounting Measurements; FASB, Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (“FAS”) 16, Prior Period Adjustments; FAS 52, Foreign Currency Translation;
FAS 95, Statement of Cash Flows; FAS 130, Reporting Comprehensive Income; FAS
141, Business Combinations; FAS 154, Accounting Changes and Error Corrections;
FASB, Accounting Principles Board Opinion (“APB”) 28, Interim Financial Reporting; APB 30, Reporting the Results of Operations–Reporting the Effects of Disposal
of a Segment of a Business, and Extraordinary, Unusual and Infrequently Occurring
Events and Transactions; FASB, Accounting Research Bulletin (“ARB”) 43, Restatement and Revision of Accounting Research Bulletins; FASB, FASB Interpretation (“FIN”) 39, Offsetting of Amounts Related to Certain Contracts. For IFRS, see
generally IAS 1; IAS 7, Cash Flow Statements; IAS 8, Accounting Policies, Changes
in Accounting Estimates and Errors; IAS 21, The Effects of Changes in Foreign Exchange Rates; IAS 29, Financial Reporting in Hyperinflationary Economies; IAS 32,
Financial Instruments: Presentation.
97
APB 30, ¶ 1, 10–12.
98
IAS 8.
99
See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Law and Accounting: Cases and Materials 306–11
(2005) (excerpting FAS 146, Accounting for Costs Associated with Exit or Disposal
Activities).
100
IAS 37, Provisions, Contingent Liabilities and Contingent Assets, ¶¶ 14–35.
IASB is reconsidering its approach to restructuring costs to align the IFRS approach
more closely with the US GAAP approach. See IASB Press Summary, IAS 37
Round-table Discussions, available at http://www.iasb.org/NR/rdonlyres/2C92E25AF831-4399-95F2-A6840DCBFA1F/0/IAS37roundtablespresssummary.pdf. As of February 2009, IASB anticipates adopting a final standard during the first half of 2010.
See IASB, Liabilities—Amendments to IAS 37 Provisions, Contingent Liabilities and
Contingent Assets and IAS 19 Employee Benefits ¶ 5 (2009), available at
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III. Cash Flow Statements
Interest and
Dividends

Interest paid and
dividends received must be
classified as operating cash
flows; dividends paid must be
classified as financing cash
flows101

Choice allowed in classifying:
1. Dividends and
interest paid or received as
operating cash flows, or
2. Interest or dividends paid
as financing cash flows and
interest or dividends received
as investing cash flows102

http://www.iasb.org/NR/rdonlyres/B2EE99F3-C48E-40A1-88275137C92C0EF4/0/ LiabIAS37UpdateFeb09.pdf.
101
See Cunningham, Law and Accounting, supra note 99, at 48–50 (excerpting SEC
Regulation S-X, 17 C.F.R. § 210.3–04 (treatment of dividends) and Accounting Research Bulletin (“ARB”) 43, Ch. 3A, ¶ 4).
102
IAS 7, ¶¶ 31–34.
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103

IV. Revenue Recognition
Service
Contracts
MultiElement
Contracts

Long-Term
Construction
Contracts

Generally, amortize over
service period without
up-front recognition104
Defer recognition on
delivered portion if nondelivery of remainder
triggers a refund106
Allows percentage of
completion method to be
approached using either
revenue-cost or gross-profit
measures

Requires completed contract
method in certain
circumstances108

103

Allows up-front recognition
when partial performance has
occurred105
Recognize on delivery of
portion even if non-delivery
of remainder triggers a
refund, so long as delivery
probable107
Requires revenue-cost
approach to percentage of
completion method (unless
percentage not reliably
estimable, in which case
requires cost recovery
method)
Prohibits completed contract
method109

For US GAAP, see generally CON 5; SEC, Staff Accounting Bulletin (“SAB”)
104, Revenue Recognition; AICPA, Statement of Position (“SOP”) 81-1, Accounting
for Performance of Construction-Type and Certain Production-Type Contracts; SOP
97-2, Software Revenue Recognition; FASB, Emerging Issues Task Force Abstract
(“EITF”) 99-17, Accounting for Advertising Barter Transactions; EITF 00-21, Revenue Arrangements with Multiple Deliverables; FASB, Technical Bulletin (“FTB”) 901, Accounting for Separately Priced Extended Warranty and Product Maintenance
Contracts. For IFRS, see generally IAS 11, Construction Contracts; IAS 18, Revenue;
IFRS, International Financial Reporting Interpretations Committee Interpretation
(“IFRIC”) 13, Customer Loyalty Programmes.
104
See Cunningham, Law and Accounting, supra note 99, at 118–22 (excerpting
SEC, Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release No. 1454, In re Gunther International, Ltd. (Sept. 25, 2001) and FAS 45, Accounting for Franchise Fee Revenue).
105
IAS 18.
106
See Cunningham, Law and Accounting, supra note 99, at 100–01 (excerpting SAB
101, Revenue Recognition in Financial Statements and CON 5 ¶¶ 83(b), 84(a) &
84(d)).
107
IAS 18, ¶¶ 14–19.
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V. Short-Term Investments & Financial Instruments
Hedging gains/
losses from
forecasted
transactions and
firm
commitments
Determining
hedge
effectiveness
Macro-hedging
Reclassifications
of investments
in to the
“trading” class

108

1013

110

Not included when initially
measuring hedged item111

Are included when
initially measuring hedged
item from cash flow
hedges112

Can be assumed in some
cases113

Must be demonstrable in all
cases114

Prohibited115
Required in some cases (but
reclassification from trading
prohibited)117

Permitted116
Prohibited (both to or from
trading)118

Cunningham, Law and Accounting, supra note 99, at 122–28 (excerpting ARB 45,
Long-Term Construction-Type Contracts and SEC, In re Touche Ross & Co. (Nov.
14, 1983)).
109
IAS 18, ¶¶ 26–28.
110
For US GAAP, see generally FAS 133, Accounting for Derivative Instruments
and Hedging Activities; FAS 137, Deferral of the Effective Date of FASB Statement
No. 133; FAS 138, Accounting for Certain Derivative Instruments and Certain Hedging Activities; FAS 149, Amendment of Statement 133 on Derivative Instruments and
Hedging Activities; FAS 155, Accounting for Certain Hybrid Financial Instruments;
EITF D-102, Documentation of the Method Used to Measure Hedge Ineffectiveness
under FASB Statement No. 133. For IFRS, see generally IAS 39, Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement; IFRS, International Financial Reporting Standard (“IFRS”) 7, Financial Instruments: Disclosures; IFRIC 9, Reassessment of Embedded Derivatives.
111
FAS 133, ¶¶ 29–35; FAS 138, ¶¶ 1–4.
112
IAS 39, ¶¶ 78, 86, 95, 97; see also Deloitte, Summaries of IFRSs, IAS 39,
http://www.iasplus.com/standard/ias39.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2009).
113
See Cunningham, Law and Accounting, supra note 99, at 357–60 (excerpting FAS
133).
114
IAS 39, ¶¶ 71–102 (especially ¶ 81).
115
FAS 133, ¶¶ 357, 443, 447, 449.
116
IAS 39, ¶¶ 71–102; see also Deloitte, IAS 39, supra note 112.
117
See FAS 159, The Fair Value Option for Financial Assets and Financial Liabilities, ¶ 29; see also id. at A51–52 (noting that continuing differences in accounting for
financial instruments between GAAP and IFRS exist, “principally [as] to disclosures,
scope exceptions, and whether certain eligibility criteria must be met to elect the fair
value option”).
118
IAS 39, ¶¶ 50–54.
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VI. Inventory
Methods
Measurement
Adjustments

119

Allows LIFO or FIFO (and
others)119
Lower of cost or
market121
Lower of cost or market adjustments cannot be
reversed123

Prohibits LIFO120
Lower of cost or net
realizable value (“NRV”)122
Lower of cost or NRV must
be reversed in some cases124

See Cunningham, Law and Accounting, supra note 99, at 187–88 (excerpting
ARB 43, Ch. 4, Stmts. 4 & 8), 190–91 (excerpting In re Arthur Andersen & Co.
(FIFO)), 194–97 (excerpting United States v. Ingredient Technology Corp. (LIFO)).
120
IAS 2, Inventories, ¶ 25.
121
See Cunningham, Law and Accounting, supra note 99, at 205–06 (excerpting
ARB 43, Ch. 4, Stmts. 5–6).
122
IAS 2, ¶ 9.
123
See Cunningham, Law and Accounting, supra note 99, at 205–06 (excerpting
ARB 43, Ch. 4, Stmts. 5–6); see also SEC, Codification of Staff Accounting Bulletins,
Topic 5: Miscellaneous Accounting Topics, Section BB. Inventory Valuation Allowances, http://www.sec.gov/interps/account/sabcodet5.htm (last visited Mar. 26, 2009).
124
IAS 2, ¶ 33.
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VII. Tangible Long-Lived Assets

125

Measurement

Requires cost basis126

Impairment
Tests

Impairment suggested when
book value exceeds gross
expected future cash flows;
second step measures
amount of impairment using
discounted cash flow
analysis128
Recognized in current
income130

Impairment
Effects

Impairment
Reversals
Investment
Property

Impairments, once
recognized, cannot be
reversed 132
Required to be at
depreciated cost134

1015

Allows cost basis or fair
value127
Impairment suggested when
book value exceeds greater of
value in use (discounted cash
flows) or fair value less cost to
sell129

If cost method used,
impairments recognized in
income; if revaluation used,
impairment usually treated as
balance sheet adjustment131
Recognized impairments
reversed in certain cases133
Allowed at depreciated cost
or fair value135

125
For US GAAP, see generally FAS 34, Capitalization of Interest Cost; FAS 143,
Accounting for Asset Retirement Obligations; FAS 144, Accounting for the Impairment or Disposal of Long-Lived Assets; FAS 154; ARB 43, Restatement and Revision of Accounting Research Bulletins; APB 6, Status of Accounting Research Bulletins; FIN 47, Accounting for Conditional Asset Retirement Obligations. For IFRS see
generally IAS 16, Property, Plant and Equipment; IAS 23, Borrowing Costs; IAS 36,
Impairment of Assets.
126
See Cunningham, Law and Accounting, supra note 99, at 148–50 (excerpting
CON 5 ¶ 67a and In re Harlan & Boettger, LLP).
127
IAS 16, ¶¶ 29–31; IAS 36, ¶¶ 18–57.
128
See Cunningham, Law and Accounting, supra note 99, at 165–67 (excerpting
SFAS 144, ¶¶ 7, 23).
129
IAS 36, ¶ 6 (providing relevant definitions) and ¶¶ 7–17 (discussing test).
130
See Cunningham, Law and Accounting, supra note 99, at 167 (excerpting SFAS
144, ¶ 25).
131
IAS 36, ¶¶ 58–64.
132
See Cunningham, Law and Accounting, supra note 99, at 165–68 (excerpting FAS
142, Goodwill and Other Intangible Assets, ¶ 15 and FAS 144); FAS 144 ¶ B53.
133
See IAS 36, ¶¶ 110–124 (addressing reversal of impairment); see also Deloitte,
Summaries of IFRSs, IAS 36, http://www.iasplus.com/standard/ias36.htm (last visited
Feb. 22, 2009).
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Generally expensed136

[Vol. 95:989

Capitalized137

134
See Ernst & Young, US GAAP vs. IFRS, at 15 (2009), available at
http://www.ey.com/Global/assets.nsf/International/IFRS_v_GAAP_basics_Jan09/$file
/IFRS_v_GAAP_basics_Jan09.pdf (stating that investment property is not a separately defined classification in US GAAP).
135
IAS 40, Investment Property, ¶ 30; see also Deloitte, Summaries of IFRSs, IAS
40, http://www.iasplus.com/standard/ias40.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2009). Initial measurement is at cost. See IAS 40, ¶¶ 20, 23; IASC Foundation, Technical Summary,
IAS 40, available at http://www.iasb.org/NR/rdonlyres/0E7AB953-8BE4-4799-97BCA3BDE0B01A3E/0/IAS40.pdf.
136
See FASB, Board Meeting Handout: Planned Major Maintenance Activities 3
(Mar. 8, 2006) (noting intent to issue an FSP to require direct expensing of all maintenance activities), available at http://72.3.243.42/board_handouts/03-08-06.pdf.
137
IAS 16, ¶ 13.
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VIII. Intangible Long-Lived Assets
Research
Development
Costs

Expensed as incurred;
included in operating cash
flows138

Estimated
residual value

Present value of
expected disposal
proceeds140

General
Impairment
Tests
Goodwill
Impairment
Test

Fair value142

Impairment
Reversals
Revaluations

Research costs expensed as
incurred; development costs
capitalized and amortized;
portion capitalized
included in investing cash
flows139
Current net selling price,
assuming asset is in expected
age/condition as at end of
useful life141
Higher of use value or fair
value less costs to sell143

Special test compares fair
value of cash
generating unit to book
value, then compares goodwill to carrying value144
Prohibited 146

Permitted in some cases147

Prohibited 148

Permitted in some cases149

No special test (use one similar to other long-lived assets,
a single-step computation)145

138
See Cunningham, Law and Accounting, supra note 99, at 144–45 (excerpting FAS
No. 142 ¶ 10).
139
IAS 38, Intangible Assets, ¶¶ 51–71; see also IASC Foundation, Technical Summary, IAS 38, http://www.iasb.org/NR/rdonlyres/149D67E2-6769-4E8F-976D6BABEB783D90/0/IAS38.pdf.
140
FAS 142, ¶ 13.
141
IAS 38, ¶¶ 100–03; see also IASC Foundation, supra note 139.
142
FAS 144, ¶ 7; see also id. ¶ 5 (noting that the standard does not apply to a variety
of accounting measurements, such as goodwill or certain other intangible assets).
143
IAS 36, ¶ 18.
144
FAS 142, ¶¶ 18–22.
145
IAS 36, ¶¶ 80–99; see also IASC Foundation, Technical Summary, IAS 36,
http://www.iasb.org/NR/rdonlyres/A288C781-7D39-4988-BA71-9AB77A263BA0/0/
IAS36.pdf.
146
See Cunningham, Law and Accounting, supra note 99, at 165–68 (excerpting FAS
142, ¶ 15 and FAS 144); FAS 144, ¶ B53; see also supra note 128.
147
IAS 36, ¶¶ 109–25.
148
See Cunningham, Law and Accounting, supra note 99, at 168 (excerpting FAS
142 ¶ 17).
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Virginia Law Review
Not usually recomputed after
initial computation150

[Vol. 95:989

Recomputed at each balance
sheet date151

IAS 38, ¶¶ 75–87.
See Cunningham, Law and Accounting, supra note 99, at 180–81 (excerpting FAS
143 ¶¶ 3–11).
151
IAS 37, ¶ 59.
150
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IX. Long-Term Investments
Classification

Only securities are classified
as trading, available-for-sale,
or held-to-maturity152

Investee
Positions
Unlisted
securities
De-recognition

Equity method

Investment
Property

152

Cost
Based on surrendering
control; diminishes reliance
on risks-and-rewards analysis
Prohibits partial derecognition155
Must be accounted for by cost
(and depreciation) method157

All financial investments,
including securities, are
classified as trading,
available-for-sale, or held-tomaturity153
Equity method, cost, or fair
value
Cost or fair value if reliable
measure available154
Based on risks-and-rewards
and control analyses

Allows partial derecognition156
Can be accounted for by cost
(and depreciation) method,
or by fair value method with
changes reported in income158

FAS 115, Accounting for Certain Investments in Debt and Equity Securities, ¶ 4.
IAS 39, ¶ 2.
Id. ¶¶ 43–70 (especially ¶ 46).
155
FAS 140, Accounting for Transfers and Servicing of Financial Assets and Extinguishments of Liabilities, ¶¶ 125–140.
156
IAS 39, ¶¶ 14–42.
157
APB 6, ¶ 17.
158
IAS 40, ¶ 30.
153
154
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X. Business Combinations and Consolidated Financial
Statements
Consolidation
Test

Consolidation

Based on majority
ownership

Based on control

Closing date generally used
for recognizing acquisitions159
Required as to majority
owned subsidiaries unless
parent does not exercise
control161

Control date used for
recognizing acquisitions160
Required as to controlled
entities unless except for
interests in acquired
subsidiaries classifiable as
“held for sale” 162
Must conform164

Parent-Sub
Accounting
Policies
Conformity
PostAcquisition
Obligations

Not necessary to
conform163

Recognize only for existing
activities begun before
acquisition, to be completed
in one year165

Recognize only for provisions
that had been recognized by
acquired entity

Restructuring
Reserves

Can be recognized if postacquisition restructuring of
acquired entity planned

Generally not allowed,
unless acquired entity had
recorded contingent
liability before transaction

159

See Cunningham, Law and Accounting, supra note 99, at 267–72 (excerpting FAS
94, Consolidation of All Majority-Owned Subsidiaries and ARB 51, Consolidated Financial Statements); FAS 141, ¶¶ 10–11.
160
IAS 27, Consolidated and Separate Financial Statements, ¶¶ 1, 4, 21.
161
See Cunningham, Law and Accounting, supra note 99, at 267–92 (excerpting FAS
94; ARB 51, Consolidated Financial Statements; FAS 141).
162
IAS 27. A prior standard stated an exception in terms of temporary control. See
Deloitte, IAS 39, supra note 112.
163
FAS 141, ¶¶ 60–66 (discussing subsequent accounting practices); see Deloitte,
IFRSs and US GAAP: A Pocket Comparison 31 (2008) (noting as to different accounting policies of parents and subsidiaries that IFRS requires them to be conformed whereas US GAAP has no specific requirements).
164
IAS 27, ¶¶ 28–29.
165
FAS 141, ¶¶ 51–56.
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XI. Contingencies
Contingent
Gains

Not recognized166

Can sometimes be
recognized in narrow
circumstances167

XII. Long-Term Liabilities
Convertible
Debt

Classified as a liability168

Defaulted
Debt

Classifiable as long-term if
waiver of default obtained
before financial statements are
issued

166

Classified as both a liability
and equity based on relative
fair values169
Classifiable as long-term if
waiver of default obtained
before balance sheet date

FAS 5, Accounting for Contingencies, ¶ 17.
These narrow circumstances include recognition of gains in connection with uncertain tax positions and by interpretation and application of provisions dealing with
contingent assets and contingent liabilities. See IAS 37.
168
APB 14, Accounting for Convertible Debt and Debt Issued with Stock Purchase
Warrants, ¶ 12.
169
IAS 32, ¶¶ 28–32.
167
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XIII. Leases
Capital
Leases170

Based on presence of any one
of four defined criteria171

Based on examination of risks
and rewardstransferred172

Third-Party
Support

Excluded from minimum
lease payments analysis of
capital lease classification
decision173

Included in minimum lease
payments analysis of capital
lease classification decision

Output
Contracts

Classified as leases

Not classified as leases

170

GAAP uses the term capital leases; IFRS uses the term finance leases.
FAS 13, Accounting for Leases, ¶¶ 6–7.
172
IAS 17, Leases, ¶¶ 7–8.
173
FAS 13, ¶¶ 20–22.
171
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XIV. Pensions / Postretirement Benefits
Past Service
Costs
Minimum
Liability

Pension
Assets
Legal Changes

Termination
Benefits

174

Amortized over service
period or life expectancy of
workers174
At least the unfunded
accumulated pension benefit
obligation appears in the
balance sheet as a minimum
liability176
No limitation on recognition
of pension assets178
May not be anticipated in
variables used in making
calculation
Expensed when employees
accept and amount can be
estimated; recognize
contractual benefits when it is
probable that employees will
accept180

Expensed175

No minimum liability
reported in the balance
sheet177

Some limitation on
recognition of pension
assets179
Should be anticipated in
variables used in making
calculation
Expensed when employer is
committed to pay181

FAS 87, Employers’ Accounting for Pensions, ¶¶ 162–67.
IAS 19, Employee Benefits, ¶ 10.
176
FAS 87, ¶¶ 144–56.
177
IAS 19, ¶¶ 49–60.
178
FAS 87 ¶¶ 117–23.
179
IAS 19, ¶¶ 102–04.
180
FAS 88, Employers’ Accounting for Settlements and Curtailments of Defined
Benefit Pension Plans and for Termination Benefits, ¶ 15.
181
IAS 19, ¶ 133.
175

